IS and Failure
Wednesday, March 31, 2004
Within an organisation, the information system constitutes the essential infrastructure of the business organisation. The major factors that lend to an organisations success or failure of managerial, organisational and technological factors depend on it.
In a recent statement released by the OECD in the U.K. government’s White Paper, it illustrates the importance of the emergence of the ‘knowledge based economy’ and why industry ‘s dependence of their commodity of knowledge and data today and the way they utilise it constitutes their success as an organisation.
".... the emergence of knowledge based economies.... has profound implications for the determinants of growth, the organisation of production and its effect on employment and skill requirements and may call for new orientations in industry-related policies."
OECD (1998a).
More apparently today, we see industries applying more importance to the implementation and improvement of Information systems, to attempt to strengthen and ensure the survival of their organisation as a whole. In events of systems failures the resulting consequences are often highly complex and can cause significant problems because they can occur in so many variations and from various sources. They are often a result of the fact that the system the organisation is using does not perform as they would have intended, or in the case of the implementation of a new system, it is not the system that they had intended to build. The reasons for the failure of systems are vast and complex in the majority of projects undertaken, below is a statement of finding by the Standish Group International Inc., a research firm in Dennis, Mass.
“46 percent of IT projects were over budget and overdue, and 28 percent failed altogether. Another of its studies cites even grimmer success rates—only 24 percent of IT projects undertaken by Fortune 500 companies in 1998 will be completed successfully.”
Evidently, system failure is not uncommon, and only a small minority of information systems developments projects can be considered to be successful, in recent months, the British government themselves have experienced trouble with computer projects. Recent disasters include Pathway, the Post Office's swipe-card project, which was being developed with the Benefits Agency, problems with the national insurance recording system, the immigration and nationality directorate computer, and the Home Office's passport system. .
As to why they still continue to happen, in hindsight, designers and implementers of such systems should be able to identify why they occur. Difficulty still remains because the implications of system failure are often so complex and unique that it is unlikely that even in hindsight, designers of information systems are able to decipher or predict what kind or when a failure could happen (this will be explored further) and contributing factors of system failure can be due to any number and kinds of effects within an organisation’s environment, e.g. computer hardware, software, power failure, users, etc. and within Information Systems Development Projects
In this project I shall attempt to discuss the various causal and effects of information system failures, based on 2 chosen case studies to identify in these studies, what kind of system failure occurred, why they happened, what was done to resolve the problems faced by the organisations involved, and more importantly, what positive and negative experience was gained from it.
Information System Failure
The two systems that I have selected from numerous accounts of failure of information systems have acquired “failure status” have been involved in much publicised accounts (both are selected from articles published on, CIO Magazine’s web site, CIO.com )
Case Study 1
This case study in an illustration of the way bad project management from the inception of a large-scale project can often result in the imminent failure of a project.
In 1990 the Washington State Department of Licensing launched its License Application Mitigation Project (LAMP), budgeted initially at $41.8 million with a 5 year limit to complete, its goal was to automate the state's vehicle registration and license renewal processes. 3 years later in 1993 there were further delays, the budget eventually swelled to $51 million and the legislature changed their schedule during the course of the project, new licensing laws were passed, and funds were diverted to a new construction site. Legislators calculated that the project would amount to $4.2 million to operate. Therefore, even if the project were completed, it would continue to be a huge and costly waste of money.
George Lindamood who stepped in as director in 1993of the state's IS department was quoted as saying,
"The project was stopped dead in its tracks." And even had the project not stalled, he says, "it would have been much too big and obsolete by the time it was finished." And despite Lindamood attempts to save the project, in 1997 the LAMP project was abandoned, but only after seven years and it was estimated that nearly $40 million had been wasted in the attempt.
Analysis of case study 1
The signs of failure for this project was evident from it’s inception, it includes mixed factors of very poor project management from people involved, possibly also badly defined objectives and poor communication between parties involved, which would include in particular the state legislatures, and administrators.
It would appear that the project was also allowed to continue for up to seven years, to pursue a project that had already appeared to be failing and wasting increasing amounts of money, and there was no action or initiatives in place to prevent this from happening, and no decisive recalls to take immediate remedial action was attempted. Project management should have identified and taken the following actions:
(a) Predict likely problems that may arise in future developments; or accurately recognize the symptoms of failures in an existing troubled situation.
(b) Accurately identify what is truly going on in these situations.
(c) Then, select a suitable means of handling the situation
The undertaking of this major project was great and as stated in CIO.com “with too few solid deliverables along the way”6. The system, without any clearly defined objectives, also seemed to neglect what exactly the State, the public and users, would gain form using it; the initial goal was intended to provided an automated licence and renewal service to the public; since the project was scrapped and was never at any time piloted or put into use, it would appear that the Washington State Department of Licensing would have had to continued to administer licence and vehicle renewal as they had done before, which would therefore also beg the question as to whether the State public really required the service in the first place, for there appears from reports that there was little or no disruption made to the usual services.
In terms of the design of the system, CIO reported that the design of the project was ‘split’ between in-house developers and a private industry contractor, which as a result led to poor coordination in project management and delays. Poor communication between management and development departments, promises an imminent failure in the project in terms of design co-ordination, keeping to time restrictions and costs.
Case Study 2
In the U.K. periodic renewal of passports are compulsory for both children and adults. And consequently, everyone living within the U.K., permanently or with a visa has regular and consistent dealings with the home office, based in South London. With the increasing number of people immigrating into and demands for passport renewal for new passports and visa, there resulted in a serious administrative backlog of applications that were not dealt with. And at its height, reported figures reached 538,000, over half a million applications.
The government then introduced a £120 million computer system at the country's Passport Agency to attempt to speed up application processes. However, instead of processing times shortening, processing times for passport applications stretched to eight weeks instead of the usual 10 days. Chaos ensued as the backlog of applications grew increasing and telephone calls went unanswered (figures reported at this stage went up to over a million in May 1999 alone). More and more applicants all over the U.K. began to go in person to the Home Office to enquire into their passport applications, and increasing numbers of people were forced to cancel holiday plans.
The computer contractor that had developed the system was Siemens Business Services. Siemens also prior to this developed the government's attempt at computerization of the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND), which had, costs the government £77 million. This system was designed to handle applications for asylum, extended stays and citizenship. But instead of processing 3,000 applications a month in fall 1998, as was the figures during the period prior to the implementation of the system, the number of applications processed had dropped drastically to a mere 995 by January 1999. It was found that the legal status of thousands of applicant was unclear and queues of applicants returned to the Home office forming queues that stretched for hundreds of yards. And again, telephone calls went unanswered and mail unreplied.
The system that was intended to help process more applications more efficiently and faster, with fewer people required to administer it, instead it was now taking very much longer, and requiring more people to administer as additional staff had to be recruited to deal with the massive backlog in administration, that was meant to reduce, not increase it. A means to settle matters between the Home office and the contractors that were employed to do the job, The National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committees, (which monitor government spending), initially fined Siemens £4.5 million for its role in the disaster. (However this penalty levied on them was much smaller and was ordered to pay a fine of £66,000 instead), another significant effect the new system had on the public resulted in the cost of processing passports to rise from £12 to £15.50, which was duly unfair to the public, as they had already suffered enough as a consequence of this matter, and were expected to pay more to recover the losses made from this waste of government spending.
Analysis of case study 2
The focus of the system failure that took place in this case study evidently shows that there was evidently only a ‘partial failure’ of the system as opposed to a ‘total failure’, the Home Office could only carry out part of the services they were expected to provide, for administrative backlogs began to grow increasingly, and as a public governmental service, was under performing to a great extent.
I do not think that Siemens could be so much to blame for this downfall of the Home Office’s new processing system as perhaps the Home Office executive administrators themselves for it appears that they merely implemented what their client required, there were not reports of hardware failure or software failure on their part, the system appeared to have been implemented to work to process the public’s applications for
mainly passport and visa renewals. The confusion of the legal status of various people living within the country was overlooked and became unclear because of the increasing number of immigrants that were arriving to the U.K., which included those that were of foreign and of refugee status. This type of ‘confusion’ of data, can have a disastrous effect on the country as a whole, the ramifications of retaining immigrants, without status can only mean that refugees (whether or not they are granted asylum) remain in the U.K, whilst skilled, high positioned individuals professionals who have been invited to work in the U.K., still do not have a confirmed status and are also in the same position. Focus was placed increasingly not only on the negative economic effects as people began to lose job opportunities, investment in business etc. but also the harmful social ramifications.
Conclusion
The causes of system failures vary quite considerably; the evaluation of the two case studies represent clearly the way in which many projects will fail reasons due mainly to, inadequate requirements (i.e. unspecific ally defined goals and objectives), Insufficient resources (e.g. manpower, skill, time, money etc.) and inappropriate human intervention (i.e. the lack of communication and intervention, and where too much at the wrong place and time is not necessary)
The design and structuring of Information Systems is not unlike the design of System Software, which uses methods such as object orientated modelling which help identify within the system, the entities (or actors) and attributes of varying levels, external and internal (starting from base ‘0’), of data flows that are input and output from the system, where they stem from and what entities they effect. This method of modelling, helps designers to ‘predict’ what a system will do, and what purposes or uses it will serve, and to whom. Keeping the end users in mind is an essential aspect to the design of the system for the end user not only represent what the objective of the project is but they also fulfil the role of those who will use it to make the entire project effective to create a successful output result.
However, unlike software, which when developed and used; has a uniform structure that has been design to remain operative in a certain way for particular users for a period of time, Information systems as aforementioned (case study 2 analysis), is very much formulated to the institutional environment that it aims to help. Situations such as the ones the Case Studies illustrate, although the operations of the two institutions bear some similarities, such as:
· they are both State or governmental organisations that are providing a service to the public
· they aim to provide automated renewal facilities (that require to be updated periodically)
· they are both bureaucratic institutions, and function as such.
Amongst other similarities, these projects that were implemented were attempts to improve the efficiency of their bureaucratic systems, to in effect: process a greater amount of public administration with greater ease and accuracy and to ultimately improve public services and reduce administrative and staffing costs. If we were to analyse the case studies using the CMM model (Capability Maturity Model), we could perhaps predict (to an extent) that the Case study 1, had it been subjected to a pilot or even a full launch, could have resulted in similar chaotic effects as what happened with the UK Home Office, where confusion and massive backlogs of administration built up over a short period of time. In terms of cost, we might also find that had the it been put into place, the LAMP project would not only cost a $4.2 million to operate, but also, judging from the Home Office case, they could perhaps also anticipate addition costs due to that, proper objectives and goals were not put into place, even at the project inception.
It has become increasingly evident if not crucial for efficient, operative Information Systems and Safety critical systems (not always necessarily related to I.T.) to be implemented in current organisations to not only improve on and cut administrative costs, but to ensure that incidents such as the rail disaster of the accident at Ladbroke Grove Junction, West London, on 5 October, where due to ‘possible’ system failure (signal failure) a Thames Train and a First Great Western Train collided and 31 people died. There has even been evidence that up to 21 signals failure had happened prior to this event over the past 5 years. Although there has been a lot of speculation as what happened, possible system failure was related to suggest the accident would have been prevented had installation and correct operation of a Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) been implemented. In this case, preventative measures were not put into place to improve a system when it was clear that it would have made a difference.
The IS planning for the implementation of a new system, is an important and fundamental aspect that must have its goals and objectives clearly set and defined by the appropriate placement of actors and their roles within the system of the organisation. The management clearly understood that their current processing system required to be upgraded to become faster and more efficient, however, it soon transpired that there were many other aspects of the organisation that needed restructuring and improvement. In an essay by Neil McBride on ‘Chaos Theory and Information Systems’ , he describes how the ‘Organisation’ is a “Dynamic and changing” in the sense that the organisation is and will always be effected by the environment of the organisation, social, institutional, etc. IS should be structured around the organisation to mould and bend to it rather than the other way around
“Organisations are dynamic and changing. They are in a constant state of flux, being created (or born), developing and dying. They are constantly learning, changing, in response to the environmental forces, changing human networks and changing concepts.” 5
This statement rings all the more, true as we refer to the previous paragraph; an IS implemented to work with social, industrial, environmental etc. institutions, to improve systems or even to implement new ones. Clearly, for a IS system to work effectively, the groundwork or the foundation to implement such projects need to be in place for it to not only work, but to remain effectively in place. In this case, we can see that the status of the various people living and working in the U.K., was and is still variable, depending various situations and circumstance, this factor although on the surface appeared of lesser importance, certainly proved to represent not only a significant data attribute to the system, but was in effect was also greatly effected by the external entities of the system, namely, the internal and external social and political position
of the organisation.
SOURCES & Bibliography
‘Management Information Systems (6th Edition) Organisation and the Technology in the Networked Enterprise.’
Kenneth C. Laudon, Jane P. Laudon. Prentice Hall (2000)
‘CIO Magazine’ (online)
http://www.cio.com/
‘Chaos Theory and Information Systems’ (essay)
Department of Information Systems Faculty of Computing Sciences and Engineering De Montfort University
http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~nkm/CHAOS.html
Tuesday, March 30, 2004
Within an organisation, the information system constitutes the essential infrastructure of the business organisation. The major factors that lend to an organisations success or failure of managerial, organisational and technological factors depend on it.
In a recent statement released by the OECD in the U.K. government’s White Paper, it illustrates the importance of the emergence of the ‘knowledge based economy’ and why industry ‘s dependence of their commodity of knowledge and data today and the way they utilise it constitutes their success as an organisation.
".... the emergence of knowledge based economies.... has profound implications for the determinants of growth, the organisation of production and its effect on employment and skill requirements and may call for new orientations in industry-related policies."
OECD (1998a).
More apparently today, we see industries applying more importance to the implementation and improvement of Information systems, to attempt to strengthen and ensure the survival of their organisation as a whole. In events of systems failures the resulting consequences are often highly complex and can cause significant problems because they can occur in so many variations and from various sources. They are often a result of the fact that the system the organisation is using does not perform as they would have intended, or in the case of the implementation of a new system, it is not the system that they had intended to build. The reasons for the failure of systems are vast and complex in the majority of projects undertaken, below is a statement of finding by the Standish Group International Inc., a research firm in Dennis, Mass.
“46 percent of IT projects were over budget and overdue, and 28 percent failed altogether. Another of its studies cites even grimmer success rates—only 24 percent of IT projects undertaken by Fortune 500 companies in 1998 will be completed successfully.”
Evidently, system failure is not uncommon, and only a small minority of information systems developments projects can be considered to be successful, in recent months, the British government themselves have experienced trouble with computer projects. Recent disasters include Pathway, the Post Office's swipe-card project, which was being developed with the Benefits Agency, problems with the national insurance recording system, the immigration and nationality directorate computer, and the Home Office's passport system. .
As to why they still continue to happen, in hindsight, designers and implementers of such systems should be able to identify why they occur. Difficulty still remains because the implications of system failure are often so complex and unique that it is unlikely that even in hindsight, designers of information systems are able to decipher or predict what kind or when a failure could happen (this will be explored further) and contributing factors of system failure can be due to any number and kinds of effects within an organisation’s environment, e.g. computer hardware, software, power failure, users, etc. and within Information Systems Development Projects
In this project I shall attempt to discuss the various causal and effects of information system failures, based on 2 chosen case studies to identify in these studies, what kind of system failure occurred, why they happened, what was done to resolve the problems faced by the organisations involved, and more importantly, what positive and negative experience was gained from it.
Information System Failure
The two systems that I have selected from numerous accounts of failure of information systems have acquired “failure status” have been involved in much publicised accounts (both are selected from articles published on, CIO Magazine’s web site, CIO.com )
Case Study 1
This case study in an illustration of the way bad project management from the inception of a large-scale project can often result in the imminent failure of a project.
In 1990 the Washington State Department of Licensing launched its License Application Mitigation Project (LAMP), budgeted initially at $41.8 million with a 5 year limit to complete, its goal was to automate the state's vehicle registration and license renewal processes. 3 years later in 1993 there were further delays, the budget eventually swelled to $51 million and the legislature changed their schedule during the course of the project, new licensing laws were passed, and funds were diverted to a new construction site. Legislators calculated that the project would amount to $4.2 million to operate. Therefore, even if the project were completed, it would continue to be a huge and costly waste of money.
George Lindamood who stepped in as director in 1993of the state's IS department was quoted as saying,
"The project was stopped dead in its tracks." And even had the project not stalled, he says, "it would have been much too big and obsolete by the time it was finished." And despite Lindamood attempts to save the project, in 1997 the LAMP project was abandoned, but only after seven years and it was estimated that nearly $40 million had been wasted in the attempt.
Analysis of case study 1
The signs of failure for this project was evident from it’s inception, it includes mixed factors of very poor project management from people involved, possibly also badly defined objectives and poor communication between parties involved, which would include in particular the state legislatures, and administrators.
It would appear that the project was also allowed to continue for up to seven years, to pursue a project that had already appeared to be failing and wasting increasing amounts of money, and there was no action or initiatives in place to prevent this from happening, and no decisive recalls to take immediate remedial action was attempted. Project management should have identified and taken the following actions:
(a) Predict likely problems that may arise in future developments; or accurately recognize the symptoms of failures in an existing troubled situation.
(b) Accurately identify what is truly going on in these situations.
(c) Then, select a suitable means of handling the situation
The undertaking of this major project was great and as stated in CIO.com “with too few solid deliverables along the way”6. The system, without any clearly defined objectives, also seemed to neglect what exactly the State, the public and users, would gain form using it; the initial goal was intended to provided an automated licence and renewal service to the public; since the project was scrapped and was never at any time piloted or put into use, it would appear that the Washington State Department of Licensing would have had to continued to administer licence and vehicle renewal as they had done before, which would therefore also beg the question as to whether the State public really required the service in the first place, for there appears from reports that there was little or no disruption made to the usual services.
In terms of the design of the system, CIO reported that the design of the project was ‘split’ between in-house developers and a private industry contractor, which as a result led to poor coordination in project management and delays. Poor communication between management and development departments, promises an imminent failure in the project in terms of design co-ordination, keeping to time restrictions and costs.
Case Study 2
In the U.K. periodic renewal of passports are compulsory for both children and adults. And consequently, everyone living within the U.K., permanently or with a visa has regular and consistent dealings with the home office, based in South London. With the increasing number of people immigrating into and demands for passport renewal for new passports and visa, there resulted in a serious administrative backlog of applications that were not dealt with. And at its height, reported figures reached 538,000, over half a million applications.
The government then introduced a £120 million computer system at the country's Passport Agency to attempt to speed up application processes. However, instead of processing times shortening, processing times for passport applications stretched to eight weeks instead of the usual 10 days. Chaos ensued as the backlog of applications grew increasing and telephone calls went unanswered (figures reported at this stage went up to over a million in May 1999 alone). More and more applicants all over the U.K. began to go in person to the Home Office to enquire into their passport applications, and increasing numbers of people were forced to cancel holiday plans.
The computer contractor that had developed the system was Siemens Business Services. Siemens also prior to this developed the government's attempt at computerization of the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND), which had, costs the government £77 million. This system was designed to handle applications for asylum, extended stays and citizenship. But instead of processing 3,000 applications a month in fall 1998, as was the figures during the period prior to the implementation of the system, the number of applications processed had dropped drastically to a mere 995 by January 1999. It was found that the legal status of thousands of applicant was unclear and queues of applicants returned to the Home office forming queues that stretched for hundreds of yards. And again, telephone calls went unanswered and mail unreplied.
The system that was intended to help process more applications more efficiently and faster, with fewer people required to administer it, instead it was now taking very much longer, and requiring more people to administer as additional staff had to be recruited to deal with the massive backlog in administration, that was meant to reduce, not increase it. A means to settle matters between the Home office and the contractors that were employed to do the job, The National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committees, (which monitor government spending), initially fined Siemens £4.5 million for its role in the disaster. (However this penalty levied on them was much smaller and was ordered to pay a fine of £66,000 instead), another significant effect the new system had on the public resulted in the cost of processing passports to rise from £12 to £15.50, which was duly unfair to the public, as they had already suffered enough as a consequence of this matter, and were expected to pay more to recover the losses made from this waste of government spending.
Analysis of case study 2
The focus of the system failure that took place in this case study evidently shows that there was evidently only a ‘partial failure’ of the system as opposed to a ‘total failure’, the Home Office could only carry out part of the services they were expected to provide, for administrative backlogs began to grow increasingly, and as a public governmental service, was under performing to a great extent.
I do not think that Siemens could be so much to blame for this downfall of the Home Office’s new processing system as perhaps the Home Office executive administrators themselves for it appears that they merely implemented what their client required, there were not reports of hardware failure or software failure on their part, the system appeared to have been implemented to work to process the public’s applications for
mainly passport and visa renewals. The confusion of the legal status of various people living within the country was overlooked and became unclear because of the increasing number of immigrants that were arriving to the U.K., which included those that were of foreign and of refugee status. This type of ‘confusion’ of data, can have a disastrous effect on the country as a whole, the ramifications of retaining immigrants, without status can only mean that refugees (whether or not they are granted asylum) remain in the U.K, whilst skilled, high positioned individuals professionals who have been invited to work in the U.K., still do not have a confirmed status and are also in the same position. Focus was placed increasingly not only on the negative economic effects as people began to lose job opportunities, investment in business etc. but also the harmful social ramifications.
Conclusion
The causes of system failures vary quite considerably; the evaluation of the two case studies represent clearly the way in which many projects will fail reasons due mainly to, inadequate requirements (i.e. unspecific ally defined goals and objectives), Insufficient resources (e.g. manpower, skill, time, money etc.) and inappropriate human intervention (i.e. the lack of communication and intervention, and where too much at the wrong place and time is not necessary)
The design and structuring of Information Systems is not unlike the design of System Software, which uses methods such as object orientated modelling which help identify within the system, the entities (or actors) and attributes of varying levels, external and internal (starting from base ‘0’), of data flows that are input and output from the system, where they stem from and what entities they effect. This method of modelling, helps designers to ‘predict’ what a system will do, and what purposes or uses it will serve, and to whom. Keeping the end users in mind is an essential aspect to the design of the system for the end user not only represent what the objective of the project is but they also fulfil the role of those who will use it to make the entire project effective to create a successful output result.
However, unlike software, which when developed and used; has a uniform structure that has been design to remain operative in a certain way for particular users for a period of time, Information systems as aforementioned (case study 2 analysis), is very much formulated to the institutional environment that it aims to help. Situations such as the ones the Case Studies illustrate, although the operations of the two institutions bear some similarities, such as:
· they are both State or governmental organisations that are providing a service to the public
· they aim to provide automated renewal facilities (that require to be updated periodically)
· they are both bureaucratic institutions, and function as such.
Amongst other similarities, these projects that were implemented were attempts to improve the efficiency of their bureaucratic systems, to in effect: process a greater amount of public administration with greater ease and accuracy and to ultimately improve public services and reduce administrative and staffing costs. If we were to analyse the case studies using the CMM model (Capability Maturity Model), we could perhaps predict (to an extent) that the Case study 1, had it been subjected to a pilot or even a full launch, could have resulted in similar chaotic effects as what happened with the UK Home Office, where confusion and massive backlogs of administration built up over a short period of time. In terms of cost, we might also find that had the it been put into place, the LAMP project would not only cost a $4.2 million to operate, but also, judging from the Home Office case, they could perhaps also anticipate addition costs due to that, proper objectives and goals were not put into place, even at the project inception.
It has become increasingly evident if not crucial for efficient, operative Information Systems and Safety critical systems (not always necessarily related to I.T.) to be implemented in current organisations to not only improve on and cut administrative costs, but to ensure that incidents such as the rail disaster of the accident at Ladbroke Grove Junction, West London, on 5 October, where due to ‘possible’ system failure (signal failure) a Thames Train and a First Great Western Train collided and 31 people died. There has even been evidence that up to 21 signals failure had happened prior to this event over the past 5 years. Although there has been a lot of speculation as what happened, possible system failure was related to suggest the accident would have been prevented had installation and correct operation of a Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) been implemented. In this case, preventative measures were not put into place to improve a system when it was clear that it would have made a difference.
The IS planning for the implementation of a new system, is an important and fundamental aspect that must have its goals and objectives clearly set and defined by the appropriate placement of actors and their roles within the system of the organisation. The management clearly understood that their current processing system required to be upgraded to become faster and more efficient, however, it soon transpired that there were many other aspects of the organisation that needed restructuring and improvement. In an essay by Neil McBride on ‘Chaos Theory and Information Systems’ , he describes how the ‘Organisation’ is a “Dynamic and changing” in the sense that the organisation is and will always be effected by the environment of the organisation, social, institutional, etc. IS should be structured around the organisation to mould and bend to it rather than the other way around
“Organisations are dynamic and changing. They are in a constant state of flux, being created (or born), developing and dying. They are constantly learning, changing, in response to the environmental forces, changing human networks and changing concepts.” 5
This statement rings all the more, true as we refer to the previous paragraph; an IS implemented to work with social, industrial, environmental etc. institutions, to improve systems or even to implement new ones. Clearly, for a IS system to work effectively, the groundwork or the foundation to implement such projects need to be in place for it to not only work, but to remain effectively in place. In this case, we can see that the status of the various people living and working in the U.K., was and is still variable, depending various situations and circumstance, this factor although on the surface appeared of lesser importance, certainly proved to represent not only a significant data attribute to the system, but was in effect was also greatly effected by the external entities of the system, namely, the internal and external social and political position
of the organisation.
